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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QURT.ELY

unlawful sale, storage, and manufacture of intoxicating liquors,
reads: "... . and upon conviction of the same person for the second
offense under this act, he shall be guilty of a felony ......
State v. Vandetta, 86 W. Va. 186, 103 S. E. 54, says, "The indictment need not aver that the former conviction has not been set
aside or reversed. This is defensive matter, the burden being on
the defendant to prove it at the trial." If this case is good law it
appears that its effect is to allow the indictment to plead a legal
conclusion. One cannot be considered as "convicted" as long as
there are exceptions which may clearly establish that he is not convicted.
The purpose of this article is not that of denying to a defendant
any right or defense which is necessary in a fair trial, or to disturb
any well recognized rules of pleading, but to use the principal case
as an illustration to show that when one is indicted under a statute,
the main question is whether or not the accused is guilty of violating that statute. When the primary object of the court is to decide
that question, when the interests of society demand that the question be answered, any final decision which results, or may result,
in not allowing that question to be decided, is prima facie evidence
of bad law. When it is discovered that the reason back of that
holding is the safeguarding of a "doubtful" technicality, it seems
that a finding in the lower court based on the "very right of the
ease" should not be disturbed.
-- J. G. J., Jr.

INTOXICATING

LIQUORS-SEARCHES

AND

SEIZURES-CONSTRUC-

TION-Federal prohibition agents having personal knowledge, arising from a former offer of defendants to sell them intoxicating
liquors, that defendants were engaged in transporting and selling
contraband liquors, searched, without a warrant the ear in which
they found defendants on a highway three months later. As a
result of this search sixty-eight bottles of liquor were found concealed in the upholstering. Defendants were indicted and convicted under the National Prohibition act and now assail the conviction on the ground that liquor found as a result of a search
and seizure without warrant could not properly be used in evidence,
as in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. Held, Concealed contraband liquor being illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be search-
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ed for without warrant by officers having probable cause for suspecting its presence. Carroll et al v. United States, 45 S. Ct. 280,
(Decided March 2, 1925).
This decision of the highest tribunal of justice in this country
has aroused considerable judicial, juristic and lay comment. It
is apparently the first ruling by the Supreme Court on the validity
under the Fourth Amendment of a seizure without warrant of
contraband goods in the course of transportation and subject to
forfeiture or destruction. The leading case on search and seizure
is Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 525, 29 L. ed. 746,
which is followed and affirmed by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. ed. 652 and several other cases. But
in none of these cases were the goods, in the course of transportation when searched for and seized.
It has been held however by state courts and lower federal courts
that an officer without a warrant cannot search an automobile for
intoxicants. United States v. Meyers, 287 Fed. 260; United States
v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963; Butler v. State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3;
Hoyer v. State, 193 N. W. 89 (Wis.). But even the most ardent
supporter of the doctrine of stare decisis would not claim that the
Supreme Court of the United States was bound by these decisions
of inferior courts.
The argument has been advanced however, that no search and
seizure has ever been allowed heretofore in misdemeanor cases
unless the midemeanor was committed in the presence of the
arresting officer. For the purpose of argument let it be granted
that such is the general rule. Is not, then, the practical impossibility of enforcement of the prohibition law in such a case a sufficient justification for departure from the general rule?
At least eight states, Connecticut, State v. Magnano, 117 Atl. 550;
Georgia, Jenkins v. State, 4 Ga. A. 859, 62 S. E. 574; Kentucky,
Royce v. Com., 194 Ky. 480; Mich. People v. Chyc, 219 Mich. 273;
Montana, State v. Mullen, 207 Pac.634; Oklahoma, Hess v. State, 84
Okla. 73; South Carolina, State v. Kanellos, 117 S. E. 640, and
Texas, Green v. State, 241 S. W. 1014, hold, that where an officer
has direct personal knowledge through his hearing, sight or other
sense, he may, without a warrant, seize intoxicating liquors or implements for their manufacture. And this is also the established
rule in the lower Federal courts. In re Mobile, 278 Fed. 949;
United States v. Camarota, 278 Fed. 388; Elrod v. Moss, 278 Fed.
123; Herine v. United States, 276 Fed. 806. These are cases in
which the officer saw the liquor, and thus these cases come under
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the general rule in regard to misdemeanors, although the rule as
stated in the cases last cited, would include smelling, feeling and
hearing and make a search, on other reasonable grounds for belief,
illegal. This is a remarkable result and is avoided by the holding
in the principal case.
It may be seen from this however, that the chief ground of contention is the answer to the question, "What is reasonable?" As
the court in United States v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, aptly puts it,
"Unreasonable search is the menace against which the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution and the search warrant statutes
protect. Reasonable searches are always permissible." Construed
in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when the amendment was passed, which has ever been the rule, is
such a search of the fastest wheeled vehicle unreasonable? An
officer may spend some time procuring a warrant to search a
house and yet be reasonably certain that the house will be there
when he returns. No so with an automobile, it and the liquor in
it, may be in the next state by that time.
It is submitted that the case is sound, both on authority and
common sense and that its practicability will have a universal appeal with the laity as well as with the members of the bar.
-C. M. L., Jr.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A PAROL AGREEMENT TO CONVEY REAL
ESTATE. PART PERFORMANCE TO TAKE THE CONTRACT OUT OF THE

and old man, orally promised P, his
daughter, to convey to her certain real estate in recompense for
her services and companionship while maintaining his home and
caring for him during old age. P did so care for F, and maintained
his home for a period of ten years, but never went into possession
of the land. F died, not having conveyed or devised the property
as agreed, and P sued for specific performance of F's agreement.
Held, Performance of a parol agreement to convey land in consideration of companionship during old age will be granted by a
court of equity despite non-possession of the promisee. Hurley v.
Beattie et al., 126 S. E. 562 (W. Va. 1925).
Section 4 of the Statutes of Frauds, Ch. 98 § 1, W.Va. Code provides "no action shall be brought to charge any person upon any
contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any inSTATUTE OF FRAUDS.-F,
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